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Innovation and Market Design
Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
Executive Summary
Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emis-
sion allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity
markets and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation.
Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competi-
tion is another driver of innovation seen in all the applications. Market design
fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market
failures.
I. Introduction
Market design determines the rules under which market participants
interact. In this chapter, I argue that market design can play an essential
role in promoting innovation. Fundamentally, this is done by establish-
ing rules that strengthen the incentives for innovation. Enhancing com-
petition is one common way the market design encourages innovation.
This is seen in all the examples I present. Improved price information is
another. Better price information reduces innovation risk and improves
decisions to innovate. Innovation is also encouraged by identifying
other sources of market failure and then mitigating these potential fail-
ures through the market rules.
I discuss four important applications of market design: (1) emission
allowance auctions, (2) airport slot auctions, (3) spectrum auctions, and
(4) electricity markets. For each I describe how the market design can
foster innovation.
Emission allowance auctions illustrate the important role of using
prices to motivate innovation. In contrast to command‐and‐control ap-
proaches to managing pollution, emission allowance auctions—part of
cap and trade programs—price the scarce allowances for the various
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cisions, both short‐term and long‐term, on how best to reduce emis-
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cost. The objective of the market is to provide reliable price information
for each of the pollutants and enable market participants to purchase
the desired portfolio of allowances. The market design allows for both
forward and spot purchase.
Airport slot auctions are a preferred method of allocating scarce run-
way capacity at congested airports, such as those serving New York
City. An open auction prices and assigns the scarce runway capacity,
which has desirable benefits for investment and operation, as was the
case with emission allowances. In addition, an airport slot auction can
be designed to encourage competitive entry. The alternative of giving
airport slots to incumbent carriers and then allowing trade has proved
to be ineffective. Trades other than barter transactions among incum-
bents have not taken place. In contrast, a well‐designed auction of air-
port slots provides a viable opportunity for entrants to secure the slots
needed to provide an innovative service.
Spectrum auctions have promoted the efficient pricing and assign-
ment of radio spectrum for wireless services. The market design has
played a key role in enhancing competition and innovation in wireless
services. State‐of‐the‐art auction designs allow the band plan and
technology choices to be made by the bidders rather than being set
by the regulator before the auction. Innovative technologies and busi-
ness models can then compete on par with the incumbent approaches.
Technology‐neutral auction designs are currently being implemented in
the United Kingdom.
Electricity market design demonstrates how the product design can
play an important role in enhancing competition, reducing risks, and
p r o m o t i n gi n n o v a t i o no nt h ed e m a n ds i d ea sw e l la so nt h es u p p l y
side. Wholesale electricity markets are organized as a number of auc-
tions: long‐term investment markets for capacity (or firm energy in the
case of hydro systems), medium‐term auctions for forward energy, and
spot auctions for day‐ahead and real‐time electricity. These markets
price a variety of products at different times and locations. Good de-
signs mitigate market power problems that frequently can arise, espe-
cially during times of scarcity. Forward capacity auctions coordinate the
efficient investment in new capacity. In addition, by bundling a call op-
tion to provide energy at prices above a strike price, the auction greatly
mitigates incentives to exercise market power during times of spot scarcity.
The forward energy market provides an additional hedge to customers
Cramton 114at lower energy prices. The two markets combined go a long way to-
ward eliminating market power in the spot market, improving the dis-
patch of energy resources. The product definition in the forward energy
market can also encourage innovation on the demand side. Customers
with hourly meters can be hedged for their expected energy purchase,
thereby reducing risk, yet exposed on the margin to the hourly price.
This exposure motivates demand response and investment in innova-
tive demand management systems.
Auction applications are rapidly expanding. Communication and
computational advances have certainly played an important role, but
the development of simple and powerful auction methods has been im-
portant too. Market designers now have a much richer set of tools to
address more complex problems.
I now discuss each of the four applications—emission allowances,
airport slots, spectrum, and electricity—in greater detail. Each applica-
tion uses auctions to facilitate the efficient allocation of scare resources,
promote competition, and foster innovation.
II. Emission Allowance Auctions
In many settings, there are essential gains from government policies to
curb pollution. Humans have an ever expanding ability to destroy or
preserve our environment. In the past, pollution has been addressed
through command‐and‐control regulation. Governments establish spe-
cific rules that describe what pollution abatement measures must be taken.
The problem of course is that the government setting the rules has lim-
ited knowledge about the costs and benefits of various approaches
across emitters. Indeed, the government is not even aware of the full
set of abatement methods. As a result, inflexible and inefficient rules
are established.
The alternative, which is fast growing in popularity, is for the govern-
ment to use a market‐based approach to pollution control. The lead ex-
amples are cap and trade programs, which are now used for global
pollutants such as carbon dioxide as well as regional and local pollut-
ants such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. The idea is simple. The
government focuses on establishing the environmental goal: setting a
cap on the maximum quantity of each pollutant. Then it relies on com-
petitive auctions to price the scarce resource—emission allowances.
There is no need to tell emitters whether and how each should reduce
its emissions. Rather, the abatement decision making is done by each
emitter on the basis of the price information determined in competitive
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Each emitter reduces emissions to the point at which the auction price
of allowances is equal to the emitter’s marginal cost of abatement. Re-
ductions are done by those who can reduce emissions at least cost.
A key advantage of the approach is the enormous flexibility each
emitter has to manage its emissions strategy. In addition, the approach
is simple. Prices are used to motivate the emitter to adopt efficient ap-
proaches on the basis of today’s abatement measures. Prices also moti-
vate the development of new abatement techniques—techniques that
are both less expensive and more effective at reducing emissions. In
contrast, with command and control there is no incentive for the devel-
opment of new techniques; rather the incentive is to find ways to satisfy
the command at least cost, which may actually undermine the environ-
mental goal.
Experience with cap and trade programs, such as the U.S. acid rain
program, has confirmed the economic insight that prices are effective at
achieving environmental goals at least cost and foster innovative tech-
niques for abatement going forward (Ellerman et al. 2000).
Market designs that provide better price information both in the short
term and in the long term will be more effective. When there are several
pollutants, a simultaneous ascending clock auction can allow emitters
to bid for an efficient portfolio of emission allowances (Ausubel and
Cramton 2004). Forward auctions can allow emitters to lock in prices
early as part of a risk reduction strategy. These forward prices are espe-
cially useful in motivating efficient investment decisions for longer‐run
abatement approaches.
Emission markets are relatively simple, especially for a global pollut-
ant such as carbon. Carbon allowances are a homogeneous good that
can be defined broadly. Complicating factors such as time and place are
less important. Competitive factors and network factors are also less
important. As we will see, the other applications I look at must deal
with each of these complicating factors, so more complex market de-
signs are required. Nonetheless, the foundation for each is the same:
auctions are used to price and assign scarce resources efficiently.
III. Airport Slot Auctions
Package auctions have been proposed for auctioning takeoff and land-
ing rights at congested airports, such as the three New York City air-
ports (Ball et al. 2007). The goal of the auction is to make the best use
of the scarce runway capacity. Left to their own devices, airlines will
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delay. The package auction enables each airline to bid for its preferred
package of slots. The resulting competitive prices motivate airlines to
substitute away from expensive slots, either by shifting flights to less
expensive times or by using larger aircraft to carry the same passengers
with less runway use.
Some airports, such as New York LaGuardia or Washington Na-
tional, manage congestion by limiting the number of scheduled opera-
tions in any 15‐minute period to the airport’s capacity. The airport slots
are assigned on the basis of historical use and negotiation. Then the par-
ticipants can trade slots as desired. What we have learned after many
years with this approach is that there is almost no liquidity in the mar-
ket for airport slots. Despite large changes in the industry, there are few
trades, and the few trades that do occur tend to be barter transactions
between two airlines. Prices for airport slots are not established, and an
airline, such as a new entrant, is unable to buy any significant number
of slots on the market. As a result, the airport slot cap serves as an entry
barrier, limiting competition and discouraging the efficient use of the
runway capacity. In addition, use‐it‐or‐lose‐it rules cause airlines with
surplus slots to schedule more small‐plane operations rather than sell
or lose the excess slots.
An airport slot auction promises to improve the allocation of airport
slots as a result of transparent pricing and improved liquidity for slots.
Liquidity is important in this application since airlines require a critical
mass of routes to and from the airport, and each route requires a mini-
mum number of operations each day. Shifts in strategy are apt to in-
volve many slots. An auction allows for entry and exit in a dynamic
industry.
An alternative to an auction is congestion pricing. Both seek efficient
pricing. Auctions can be designed with a multiyear lease and, thereby,
more stability in airline planning. Congestion pricing gives airlines
more flexibility to change schedules. The difficulty with congestion pri-
cing is establishing a workable process for setting prices. This process is
apt to become politicized, and in any event, determining the market‐
clearing prices without an auction is challenging.
A common critique of a slot auction is that it is just another tax that
will raise prices to consumers and limit service. This is wrong in several
ways. First, the auction is not a tax, but a method for efficiently pricing
a scarce resource—runway capacity. Indeed, the revenues from an auc-
tion can displace the distortionary passenger fees and weight‐based
fees. Revenues can also be used to improve airport infrastructure, say
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that limit scheduling to capacity, the scarcity price is already reflected in
the airline’s fare. Finally, slot auctions do not limit service, but rather
constrain scheduling to be consistent with runway capacity. When
schedules are not constrained to physical limits, the result is congestion
and delay, not increased through‐put.
Consumers benefit most from a slot auction. The immediate benefits
are reduced congestion and delay and improved predictability. Travel
costs are reduced, especially for the time‐sensitive business traveler. In
the longer term, consumers benefit from enhanced competition and in-
novation. Even just the threat of entry can cause airlines to reduce costs
and improve services.
A slot auction also has benefits for airlines. With fewer delays and
more predictable schedules, airlines save fuel, labor, and capital. Since
business travelers put a premium on predictability and short trips, de-
mand for business travel—the most profitable segment of the market—
expands. Larger and fuller planes translate into more profit per flight.
I now describe the mechanics of one proposed airport slot auction
with illustrative parameters. The product is the right to schedule a land-
ing within a particular 15‐minute time interval and a takeoff within
90 minutes of landing. Bundling a landing and takeoff makes sense since
every landing requires a takeoff. The number of slots is determined by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on the basis of through‐put.
Since schedules are done on roughly a yearly basis and commitments
to airports and routes are longer term, a 5‐year term for the slot is rea-
sonable. The terms are staggered so that 20% of the slots expire each
year. These slots are auctioned every year, providing annual liquidity
and price information. Secondary market trades of both the primary
product and derivatives are also allowed.
A single simultaneous auction is held for all congested airports. The
annual auction is a package clock auction. All slots are up for auction at
the same time. Bids are always for packages of slots: the bidder wins
one of its desired packages or nothing. As a result, there is no risk that
the bidder will win just part of what it needs.
The auction begins with an ascending clock stage. The auctioneer an-
nounces prices, and then the bidders respond with the quantity demanded
at these prices. Prices then increase on slots with excess demand, and bid-
ders again respond with demands at the new prices. The process con-
tinues until there is no excess demand for any slot. The clock stage
provides essential price discovery during the auction. The prices help fo-
cus each bidder’s valuation efforts on the most relevant packages of slots.
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their clock bids and submit additional package bids.
On the basis of the set of all package bids, the auctioneer then deter-
mines the value‐maximizing assignment of slots and the prices for slots
in each time interval. To encourage truthful bidding, a second price rule
may be used as described in greater detail in the next section.
This design has been well tested in the two applications discussed
next: spectrum auctions and electricity auctions. It has also been tested
in the experimental lab and found to have excellent efficiency proper-
ties. In addition, in February 2005, a test auction with the FAA, airport,
and airline participants was conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of
the approach.
The package clock auction gives airlines a simple and effective way
to express preferences for packages of slots. Given these preferences,
the auction then determines the efficient assignment of slots and prices.
Efficient pricing of slots motivates airlines to adjust schedules. Flights
are shifted to less congested hours. Larger planes and fewer flights are
used to serve the same number of passengers. These adjustments are
managed in a flexible way by each airline.
Importantly, the package clock auction facilitates efficient entry and
exit. In part this comes from transparent pricing and liquidity in the
market for slots but more directly from the package auction, which en-
ables a new entrant to bid for and win the package of slots it desires.
Although slot auctions have been discussed for at least 20 years, the
application is still in the proposal stage. It may be some time before the
benefits of slot auctions are seen in practice. In contrast, our next ap-
plication, spectrum auctions, has been an active area of both design
and implementation for 14 years. The benefits of the approach are
not speculative.
IV. Spectrum Auctions
Since 1994, spectrum auctions have been used to assign and price scarce
radio spectrum for wireless communication services in the United
States and elsewhere. Before auctions, beauty contests, in which com-
panies lobby the regulator for spectrum, were the primary method of
assigning spectrum. Beauty contests were both slow and costly, so slow
in the United States that, despite developing the cellular technology in
the 1960s, by the 1980s the United States had fallen behind both Europe
and Japan in developing and deploying the technology. Innovation
clearly was harmed by an ineffective method of assigning and pricing
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tions. Auctions allowed the spectrum to quickly get in the hands of
those best able to use it. Competition increased. Consumers enjoyed
lower prices and improved services. Throughout this period, the mar-
ket for wireless communications has been characterized by rapid
growth and innovation.
The spectrum auction application involves assigning many items that
are heterogeneous but similar. Often there are competing technologies
that make use of the spectrum in different ways and therefore require a
different organization of the spectrum. There is a complex structure of
substitutes and complements, and this structure varies across bidders.
The government’s primary objective is efficiency: make the best use
of the scarce spectrum resource. To a large extent this involves assign-
ing the spectrum to the companies that value it the most, although there
are also important competition issues in the downstream market for
wireless services that further complicate the market design problem.
A. Simultaneous Ascending Auction
In July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began
using the simultaneous ascending auction to award spectrum licenses.
The approach has been replicated around the world with minor varia-
tions and has become the standard approach for assigning and pricing
spectrum (Cramton 2002, 2006; Milgrom 2004). The FCC now has con-
ducted over 67 auctions using the simultaneous ascending auction.
Roughly 59,000 licenses have been auctioned, with winning bids ex-
ceeding $79 billion. Over the last dozen years, enhancements to the de-
sign have appeared, but the enhancements have been evolutionary, not
revolutionary.
The popularity and durability of the design are a reflection of its
many desirable properties. Simplicity is an important virtue. The simul-
taneous ascending auction is easily described and understood. It is a
natural generalization of the English auction when selling many related
lots. All the lots are auctioned at the same time. Each lot has a price and
a high bidder associated with it. The bidders can bid on any of the lots
by raising the high bid. The bidding continues until no bidder is willing
to raise the bid on any of the lots. Then the auction ends with each bid-
der winning the lots on which it is the high bidder and paying its bid
for any lots won.
A transparent process of price discovery is another key virtue. As
the auction progresses, bidders see the tentative price information
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the auction, bidders are able to develop a sense of what the final prices
are likely to be and can adjust their purchases in response to this price
information. To the extent price information is good and the bidder
retains sufficient flexibility to shift toward its best package, the bidder
is able to piece together a desirable package of lots. Moreover, the
price information helps each bidder focus its valuation effort on rele-
vant packages.
To encourage price discovery, an activity rule requires each bidder to
maintain a level of bidding activity throughout the auction or have its
eligibility reduced in future rounds. Each lot has a number of eligibility
points, based on the size of the lot, typically measured as the product of
the bandwidth (megahertz [MHz]) and the population coverage of the
lot. A bidder’s initial eligibility is determined by its deposit at qualifi-
cation. The bidder must be active on a specified percentage of its eli-
gibility or its eligibility is reduced. A bidder is active on a lot either if
it is the current high bidder or if it places a bid on the lot. The bidder’s
total activity in the round is the sum of the eligibility points on all lots
the bidder is active in. Typically, the required activity percentage is less
than 100% early in the auction to give the bidder greater flexibility but
is 100% or close to 100% later in the auction. With a 100% activity re-
quirement, the quantity of spectrum a bidder bids for can only stay the
same or fall as prices rise. This prevents the bidder from bid sniping—
waiting until the end of the auction to reveal its true demand.
A main simplification is accepting bids only for individual lots rather
than for packages. As a result, a bidder may attempt to win a synergis-
tic package of lots but may later find that the package is too expensive
and yet remain a high bidder on some of the lots in the package. The
auction allows bid withdrawals to enable the bidder to back out of a
failed aggregation of lots. To maintain the credibility of bids, the with-
drawing bidder remains on the hook for assuring that the seller receives
at least the amount of the withdrawn bid in revenues: the withdrawing
bidder must make up any shortfall between its bid and the eventual
sale price. This ability to withdraw bids is intended to mitigate the ex-
posure the bidder faces of the possibility of winning just some of what
it needs.
For reasons of transparency and also price discovery, the auctioneer
reports all the bids made by each bidder at the end of each round.
Despite the simplicity of the rules, the simultaneous ascending auction
is complex for bidders. The reason is that bidders often have strong incen-
tives to engage in various gaming strategies, which undermine efficiency.
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It is a simple price discovery process. Bidders can arbitrage across sub-
stitutes and piece together desirable packages of complementary li-
censes. The price discovery reduces common value uncertainty and the
winner’s curse.
At the same time, years of experience has demonstrated important
weaknesses in the design, which can reduce efficiency. Large bidders
engage in demand reduction strategies to reduce the prices paid for
the spectrum (Ausubel and Cramton 2002). Tacit collusion has also
been a problem, with bidders proposing splits of the spectrum through
their bids (Cramton and Schwartz 2002). The activity rule has led to
various parking strategies, where eligibility is maintained by bidding
on spectrum that the bidder does not desire. Since bids are for individ-
ual lots, a bidder is exposed to the risk of winning some of what it
needs. Speculators engage in various holdup strategies. Finally, de-
pending on how the spectrum is divided into lots by the regulator,
the substitution across blocks may be limited.
Limited substitution has been especially problematic in the two most
recent spectrum auctions in the United States: the Advanced Wireless
Services (AWS) auction and the 700 MHz auction. In both auctions, the
FCC, in order to accommodate the needs of a diversity of bidders, split
the bandwidth into blocks of various sizes and then used a number of
different geographic partitions for licensing. Lot sizes varied from large
regional licenses with six covering the continental United States to
small submarkets, requiring 734 lots to cover the nation. This heteroge-
neity in lot sizes undermines substitution. Despite the simultaneous
sale, bidding in the AWS auction was largely sequential. Blocks with
large regional lots were bid on first, followed in turn by the blocks with
smaller lots. A bidder seeking large regions would start out bidding for
the large lots. If prices got too high, it could switch down to the small
lots, but it would find it almost impossible to switch back up to the
large lots since it would likely remain the high bidder on many of
the small lots. This one‐way substitution means that the bidder must
guess the right time to drop down to the smaller licenses. If the bidder
waits too long, it may overpay for the large lots; if the bidder drops
down too early, it may overpay for the small lots. In the AWS auction,
concluding in September 2006, the limited substitution led to large price
differences across substitute blocks throughout the auction. At the end,
the blocks with small lots sold for a 40% discount relative to the blocks
with large lots. In the 700 MHz auction, concluding in March 2008, the
difference in prices across blocks was even more extreme, but this time
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eral times higher than the price of the block with the largest lots.
Given the packaging limitations of the simultaneous ascending auc-
tion, there is a strong tendency for the regulator to address these limita-
tions with a band plan that offers something for everyone. The basic
problem with this approach is that it tends to resolve matters that
should be settled in the auction. The more the band plan is tailored
to fit the needs of particular bidders, the less competition in the auction
and the less efficient the outcome. The auction has little to do if the
band plan makes clear who should win what.
B. Package Clock Auction
With a package auction, bidders can express preferences for comple-
mentary items without running the risk that they will win just some
of what they need. This is important, for example, in spectrum auctions
in which different technologies require that the spectrum be organized
in different ways. In the past, the regulator has been forced to decide
how the spectrum is organized with a specific band plan—effectively de-
ciding how much spectrum is available for each technology. A package
auction enables the regulator to conduct a technology‐neutral auction,
which lets the bidders determine the band plan through their competi-
tive bids. A good example is the United Kingdom’s 2.6‐gigahertz (GHz)
auction of 2008: the quantity of paired versus unpaired spectrum is de-
termined in the auction, not by the regulator. Some technologies, such
as Long Term Evolution, require paired spectrum; others, such as WiMax,
require unpaired spectrum.
One of the challenges of package auctions is finding an effective way
for bidders to convey preferences. There are simply too many packages
to ask for preferences for all possible packages. A common approach is
to begin with a clock auction (Porter et al. 2003; Ausubel and Cramton
2004; Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom 2006). The auctioneer names a
price for each product, and each bidder responds with its most pre-
ferred package. The price is then raised on all products with excess de-
mand, and the bidding continues. This price discovery process focuses
the bidders’ a t t e n t i o no np a c k a g e st h a ta re most relevant. Once this
price discovery is over, the bidders are in a much better position to submit
any additional bids, as well as to improve the bids already submitted. An
optimization is then done to determine the value‐maximizing assign-
ment as well as competitive prices that satisfy the stability constraints.
Typically, there are many such prices, so a further optimization is done
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This is the basis for the package clock auction, introduced in the last sec-
tion. It addresses the deficiencies of the simultaneous ascending auction.
This basic design is being used for a series of spectrum auctions in the
United Kingdom and has been proposed for an auction in the Nether-
lands. The design is readily tailored to alternative settings.
Here are some of the important design choices of the United King-
dom’s 2.6 GHz auction to assign 190 MHz of spectrum.
• Generic 5 MHz lots. The use of generic, rather than specific, lots is a
huge simplification. This improves substitution, enhances competition,
and greatly simplifies bidding. Further, a winner’s lots are guaranteed
to be contiguous, which makes the spectrum more valuable. Generic
lots are appropriate in this auction since the value differences of specific
assignments are likely second order. The bidder’s main determinant of
value is the quantity of paired or unpaired spectrum won.
• Package bids. There is no exposure problem since the auction uses
package bids. A bid specifies the number of paired and unpaired lots
from 2,500 to 2,690 MHz. The number of packages is modest, thanks to
the generic lots.
• Clock stage. The auction begins with a clock stage. Typically, only a
single price is needed: the price of a generic 5 MHz lot from 2,500 to
2,690. The clock stage provides excellent and simple price discovery.
The simplicity of the process is enhanced by generic lots.
• Activity rule. A simple yet powerful activity rule improves price
discovery. As prices increase, a bidder cannot increase the size of the
package.
• Supplementary bids.A tt h ee n do ft h ec l o c ks t a g e ,e a c hb i d d e rc a n
improve its clock bids as well as bid on any other packages that appear
desirable given the information revealed in the clock stage. For pack-
ages that are larger than the bidder’s final clock bid, the supplementary
bid has an upper bound. In particular, the supplementary bid can be no
more than the package price at the clock prices from the round in which
the bidder first shifted to a package that is smaller than the supplemen-
tary package.
• Assignment stage. The assignment stage translates the generic win-
nings of the clock stage into a specific assignment for each winning bid-
der. This is a sealed‐bid combinatorial auction in which each bidder
may submit top‐up bids for each feasible package consistent with the
bidder’s winnings. The value‐maximizing assignment is determined.
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use of “second pricing” (bidder‐optimal core pricing). This rule is used
to determine base prices both for the generic assignments and for the
additional payment for the specific assignment.
The design is both highly practical and theoretically sound. Although
the design is complex, my view is that it is as simple as possible, given
the complex problem that the auction is asked to solve. Any further
simplifications would compromise one or more of the objectives of
the auction. In addition, much of the complexity of the rules has the
effect of simplifying bidder decision making. The design allows each
bidder to focus on its demand for paired and unpaired spectrum rather
than complex gaming strategies.
I have conducted a series of mock auctions for Ofcom, the U.K. reg-
ulator, to test the auction design. The mock auctions demonstrated the
high efficiency of the package clock auction. Twelve auctions were con-
ducted with realistic scenarios and well‐motivated and experienced
bidders. In 11 out of 12 mock auctions, full efficiency was achieved.
In the single inefficient mock auction, the inefficiency was the result
of bidder error—the failure of a single bidder to submit her supplemen-
tary bids. Both the assignment and prices were identical to the theore-
tical benchmark. Base prices were at or close to opportunity cost
(Vickrey prices) in all cases, despite some complementarities.
The scenarios were constructed to span a wide range of outcomes. In
some, the paired bidders were so strong that the unpaired bidders won
the minimum quantity of nine. In others, the unpaired bidders were so
strong that all the spectrum went to unpaired bidders. In still others,
there was a good mix of paired and unpaired winners.
I evaluated the mock auctions with respect to six measures.
• Efficiency. The outcomes were highly efficient in a full‐scale mock auc-
tion with realistic preferences and well‐motivated subjects.
• Robustness. The desirable properties of the package clock auction
were robust to different levels of competition and different demand
structures.
• Risk. Variation in outcomes was the result of different valuation mod-
els. High efficiency and other desirable properties were observed in all
mock auctions.
• Simplicity for bidders. Subjects were able to understand the auction for-
mat and participate in the full‐scale mock auction after only a few hours
of training. Strategic considerations were easy to manage.
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was little tendency to overbid or underbid.
• Simplicity for the auctioneer. The full‐scale mock auctions were read-
ily conducted. The mock auctions demonstrated the feasibility of
implementation.
The success of these mock auctions leads me to conclude that the
package clock auction should perform well in the 2.6 GHz environment
as well as related environments. As a result, I expect it to be adopted
more broadly.
C. Competition Issues
Assigning the spectrum to those companies with the highest value goes
a long way to fostering innovation. This has been readily apparent over the
last 14 years of spectrum auctions. Nonetheless, there is good reason to
think that there may be a divergence between the bidder’s private value
and its social value of the spectrum, as a result of the bidder’s current po-
sition in the market. Incumbents typically have an incentive to limit com-
petition. To avoid foreclosure of new entry, the market design needs to
a d d r e s st h i si m p o r t a n ta s y m m e t r yb etween incumbents and new entrants
(Jehiel and Moldovanu 2000; Cramton, Skrzypacz, and Wilson 2007).
Since oligopoly rents fall as competition increases, an incumbent has
an incentive to foreclose new entry. The incumbent’s value consists of
its economic value of incremental spectrum plus the value of deterring
entry. Since an entrant’s value is just its economic value of the spec-
trum, it is certainly possible for the entrant to have a higher economic
value for the spectrum; yet the incumbent is willing to pay more as a
result of its foreclosure value. This potential inefficiency is strongest
when there are only a few strong incumbents. Then the benefits of fore-
closing entry are greater, and the ability of the incumbents to coordinate
on an entry‐blocking strategy are greater.
The first U.S. broadband auction provides an excellent illustration. At
the time of that auction at the end of 1994, there were two cellular op-
erators in each U.S. market. The auction sold two additional large li-
censes in each market. The FCC understood the importance of
competition in the downstream market for wireless services and took
essential steps to enhance competition. Specifically, the auction rules
forbid either cellular incumbent from bidding on the licenses, and an
entrant could win at most one in any geographic market. As a result,
the auction resulted in two new entrants in each market.
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that each incumbent would win one large license in each of the markets.
Doing so would maintain the substantial duopoly profits, and “each
incumbent wins one” is an obvious strategy for coordinating the fore-
closure of entry by the duopolists. Indeed, it is unlikely that the incum-
bents would face much competition in the auction since potential
entrants would see the futility of bidding against the incumbents.
This restriction on incumbents, implemented as a spectrum cap, was
arguably the most important feature of the initial market design in fos-
tering competition and innovation in the downstream market. Moving
from a duopoly to four competitors had a dramatic impact in reducing
prices and enhancing services.
Interestingly, in the 700 MHz auction, concluding March 2008, no re-
strictions were placed on how much any incumbent could win in any
market. The result was largely predictable (Cramton et al. 2007). The
two strongest incumbents, Verizon and AT&T, bid for and won the
lion’s share of the spectrum (85% by value). This spectrum was partic-
ularly valuable to Verizon and AT&T because of their incumbent posi-
tion of holding nearly all the cellular spectrum located at 850 MHz. In
contrast, the other operators, such as Sprint and T‐Mobile, rely on Per-
sonal Communications Services and AWS spectrum, which is at higher
frequencies. Thus, Verizon and AT&T, which held a duopoly position in
low‐frequency spectrum before the auction, retained their duopoly po-
sition after the auction. This position gives Verizon and AT&Ta compe-
titive advantage in providing nationwide coverage. Customers value
coverage, and the low‐frequency spectrum allows for much less expen-
sive geographic coverage. Dramatically fewer cell sites are needed since
the low‐frequency signals travel farther. Importantly, Verizon and
AT&T did not need the new spectrum to provide nationwide coverage
with low‐frequency spectrum: both already had that capability with
their current cellular licenses. Rather, winning the 700 MHz spectrum
prevented any other competitor from acquiring this same capability.
One countervailing force is the “open‐access” provision included in
the C Block won by Verizon. At least in theory, this provision opens the
Verizon network to any device and any application. In the past, each
operator tightly restricted the devices that could operate on its network
and what applications would be allowed and how they could be used.
This level of control enables the operator to extract additional economic
rents from the network but limits innovation. Any party with a good
idea for a device or an application has to negotiate with the network op-
erator first. In contrast, the open‐access provision pushes the industry
Innovation and Market Design 127closer to the Internet model, where the network operator is not able to
control devices or applications. Any nondestructive device or applica-
tion is allowed. Including the provision on just one block may suffice,
provided that competitive pressures cause AT&T and others to adopt
Verizon’s open‐access policy.
Regulators have used a variety of tools to address competition issues
in spectrum auctions. The most direct are spectrum caps, set‐asides,
bidding credits, and installment payments. In many instances these in-
struments have been effective at promoting entry and enhancing com-
petition. At other times, the instrument resulted in undesirable and
unintended consequences. For example, in the second U.S. broadband
auction, which was a set‐aside auction for small businesses, the FCC
used overly attractive installment payments. The result was specula-
tion, default, and delayed use of the spectrum. Installment payments
were subsequently eliminated. In other instances, bidding credits led
to the formation of fronts closely aligned with incumbents.
Establishing desirable competitive interventions is challenging. Still it
is a challenge that the regulator must face with careful analysis and
judgment. The interventions are often of first‐order importance to suc-
cessful market outcomes.
V. Electricity Markets
My final example of market design is electricity markets. Modern elec-
tricity markets are organized as a number of auction markets. The mar-
kets taken together are designed to provide reliable electricity at the
least cost to consumers. Spot markets determine how much each sup-
plier is generating on a minute‐by‐minute basis; forward energy mar-
kets enable customers and suppliers to lock in medium‐term (1–3 years)
prices for electricity; and long‐run investment markets coordinate new
entry to cover any expansion in electricity demand. These auction mar-
kets must be carefully designed to work together in achieving the goal
of least‐cost reliable supply. Design failures can be quite costly as the
California electricity crisis of 2000–2001 demonstrated. When the stakes
are high, an important step in market design is building prototypes and
then testing those prototypes in the experimental lab or in the field be-
fore full‐scale implementation.
Electricity markets have a number of complicating features, which
make their design especially challenging. It is not possible to address
all these complications here. Rather, I will focus on some particular fea-
tures of designs for the medium‐term and long‐term markets and argue
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cost reliable supply.
A. Long‐Term: Forward Reliability Market
In current electricity markets, the demand side has no way to express
its preferences for reliability. For this reason, in most markets the reg-
ulator has taken on the role of assuring that there are adequate gener-
ating resources. One recent approach with many desirable properties is
the forward reliability market, adopted in New England and Colombia
(Cramton 2006; Cramton and Stoft 2007, 2008). In this market generat-
ing resources are procured on an annual basis well in advance (3 years
or more) of the eventual need. When capacity is lined up well in ad-
vance of the need, new entry can compete to provide capacity. This
has two important benefits. First, the market coordinates new entry
and avoids the boom/bust cycles that are common with uncoordinated
entry. Second, it makes the market for capacity contestable and lets
competitive new entry set the price for capacity.
A key element of the design is the definition of the capacity product,
which I call a reliability option. It is physical capacity bundled with a
financial call option to supply energy above a strike price. The physical
capacity assures that there are adequate generating resources, whereas
the financial call option provides efficient performance incentives. Ca-
pacity resources face a financial obligation to supply energy whenever
the spot price is above the strike price. This obligation follows load in that
it is stated as a share of the actual demand in the hour. In this way, the
capacity payment fully hedges load from high spot prices and reduces
supplier risk as well. Market power is reduced in the spot market since
suppliers enter the spot market with a nearly balanced position in times
of scarcity. Market power in the reliability market is addressed by not
allowing existing supply to affect the capacity price. The approach is
readily adapted to either a thermal system or a hydro system.
Importantly, the hedge in the form of a reliability option does not dis-
tort a supplier’s marginal incentives in the spot market. Since any de-
viation from the obligation is priced at the spot price, the supplier
receives the spot price on the margin and is motivated by the spot price.
An important variation for load with hourly meters is to hedge load for
its expected demand rather than its actual demand, thus exposing load
to the spot price on the margin to preserve incentives for demand re-
sponse during scarcity. The impact of the option is to hedge both load
and suppliers from price volatility above the strike price. This approach
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not, however, reduce performance risk. Although all risk is costly and
hence undesirable, performance risk cannot be eliminated without
eliminating the performance incentive.
The second advantage of the option is that it greatly reduces market
power in the spot market during times of scarcity. Whenever the price
exceeds the strike price of, say, $300 per megawatt‐hour, the supplier
obligation puts the suppliers in roughly a balanced position. A supplier
in a balanced position has no incentive to distort its offer away from
marginal cost. This reduction in market power improves the efficiency
of the real‐time dispatch as well as the spot price signal.
A third advantage of the hedge is that it makes high scarcity prices
politically acceptable. High prices during scarcity are essential to moti-
vate performance. A pervasive problem in nearly all electricity markets
has been prices that are too low in times of true scarcity. A hedge en-
ables the spot price to go much higher during scarcity without political
backlash.
The capacity auction sets the payments to generators for providing
reliability options just high enough to induce optimal investment and
adequate capacity. An annual auction is used to purchase new capacity
up to the level required for reliability. These auctions determine the
price of reliability options that is just sufficient to induce the required
entry. If the cost of constructing new capacity increases or decreases as a
result of environmental restrictions or new technology, new entrants
will bid just enough higher or lower to maintain a normal rate of return,
assuming that there are no barriers to entry.
The result is that the regulator controls the level of capacity, but the
market controls the price of capacity and the type and quality of ca-
pacity built. Hence the regulatory intervention is limited to determining
the one factor about which the market has little information—the ade-
quate level of capacity.
Although the auction design requires care to address the potential
exercise of market power, the following simple procedure would work
well. Each September an auction is held for reliability options (ROs),
which take effect on January 1, just over 3 years in the future. Existing
generators may choose either to enter the auction as a price taker (i.e.,
with a zero bid) or not to sell ROs. New projects are allowed to bid
without restriction. The regulator bids a demand curve that intersects
the target adequacy level at the most recent RO price. The auction is
held using a descending clock procedure. All accepted bids are paid
the clearing price, but existing generation receives 1‐year contracts
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Once a new generator’s initial contract expires, it becomes an “existing”
generator. If no new generation is purchased in a given year, all existing
generators that bid have their contracts extended for 1 year.
All generation, new and existing, will want to sell ROs for their full
capacity because these options fetch a high price relative to the financial
cost of the option.
The benefits of this design are significant. The design minimizes risk
and market power while coordinating efficient entry.
B. Medium‐Term: Forward Energy Market
Forward contracts for energy play an important role in reducing risk
and market power in electricity markets. The reliability options, dis-
cussed above, provide price coverage above the strike price, but for-
ward energy contracts are still needed to provide price coverage
below the strike price. In most markets these forward contracts are ne-
gotiated bilateral contracts. These informal markets often are frag-
mented with little liquidity, nonstandard contracts, and high transaction
costs. An organized market with standard contracts can increase compe-
tition and liquidity and reduce transaction costs. Such an approach has
recently been proposed for Colombia (Cramton 2007). The design, sum-
marized here, illustrates again the importance of the product design to
achieve the objectives of the market.
The forward energy market is an organized market to procure energy
for electricity customers on a forward basis. It includes both the regu-
lated market (residential and other small customers) and the nonreg-
ulated market (large customers). Currently, regulated customers
represent 68% of the total electricity demand and nonregulated custom-
ers represent the remaining 32%. The proposed design is novel in that it
integrates both the regulated and nonregulated customers into a single
organized market. Although the regulated and nonregulated energy
products remain distinct, their integration into a single market facili-
tates arbitrage between the products, improves liquidity, and reduces
transaction costs. Both regulated and nonregulated customers benefit
from this unified approach.
The two customer groups, regulated and nonregulated, are inte-
grated into a single market. Regulated customers are small customers
without hourly meters; nonregulated customers are large customers
with hourly meters. The nonregulated product will make use of the
hourly meters to encourage demand response. In addition, because of their
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energy market, submitting demand bids. In contrast, the regulated cus-
tomers will have a more limited demand response capability and will
not be active buyers in the forward energy auction; their demands will
be set administratively. The two products in one market can be sum-
marized as follows:
Regulated customers (68% of the load):
• Small customers without hourly meters.
• Passive buyers in the auction.
Nonregulated customers (32% of the load):
• Large customers with hourly meters.
• Active buyers in the auction.
The proposed market is based on two load‐following products: a reg-
ulated product and a nonregulated product. For the regulated product,
each supplier bids to serve its desired share of Colombia’s regulated
load. A supplier that wins a 10% share at auction has an obligation
to serve 10% of the actual regulated load in every hour of the commit-
ment period. The supplier is paid the clearing price for every megawatt
hour of energy supplied. Deviations between the supplier’s hourly sup-
ply and obligation are settled at the spot energy price or the scarcity
price, whichever is lower. The spot settlement price is capped at the re-
liability options strike price since the firm energy market provides price
coverage for prices above the strike price (about $260 per kilowatt‐hour
in January 2007 Colombian pesos, or US$120 per megawatt‐hour; see
Cramton and Stoft 2007). The nonregulated product is essentially the
same, except each supplier bids to serve its desired share of the non-
regulated load.
One hundred percent of regulated load is purchased on behalf of the
regulated customers in a sequence of auctions. Thus, the forward en-
ergy market together with the firm energy market provide 100% price
coverage for all regulated customers, as shown in figure 1. The forward
energy market provides price coverage from zero to the scarcity price,
and the firm energy market provides price coverage above the scarcity
price. This accomplishes two things: (1) it provides rate stability for
regulated customers, and (2) it provides revenue stability for suppliers.
The result is reduced risk for both sides of the market.
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from three problems. Price risk is greater since the contract cover is
incomplete. Market power in both the spot market and the bilateral
market is more of a concern since supplier positions are more apt to
be out of balance entering the spot market and competition for bilat-
erals is weaker with specialized local products. The absence of a stan-
dard contract also results in high transaction costs in addition to weaker
competition. In contrast, the new market provides full price coverage,
suppliers enter the spot market with nearly balanced positions, and the
single product minimizes transaction costs. In addition, the problem of
self‐dealing between the utility and its supplier affiliate is eliminated.
The market is mandatory for regulated customers but voluntary for
suppliers. Mandatory participation on the demand side motivates ro-
bust participation on the supply side.
The nonregulated customers enjoy benefits from the forward energy
market similar to those of the regulated customers. The main difference
is that the nonregulated customers actively bid in the forward energy
market and thus decide how much contract cover to purchase and in
which auction. Although nonregulated customers participate volunta-
rily, I believe that most will decide to participate fully and will adopt
procurement strategies that do not differ too much from those of the
regulated customers. Since the regulated and nonregulated products
are close substitutes, the active participation of the nonregulated custom-
ers should yield improved pricing for both products.
An enormous simplification is having only a single product for each
customer group, regulated and nonregulated. Although differences in
Fig. 1. Price coverage of a regulated customer
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is different, these differences are relatively minor and can be accounted for
with a customer‐specific load shape adjustment to avoid any cross subsi-
dies that otherwise would result. Notice that the adjustment affects only
the load side and not the suppliers, since each supplier is serving a
share of the aggregate load for the particular customer group.
The energy share product enables load to be fully covered with a sin-
gle product. For a supplier, the load‐following product is natural since
in aggregate suppliers must follow load. A supplier is able to manage
its exposure to the spot energy price through its portfolio of resources
and its portfolio of nonregulated energy contracts. Even for a small sup-
plier without a portfolio of resources or energy contracts, the risk from
spot price exposure is modest.
The proposed product does an excellent job of rate stability. Regu-
lated load is fully hedged from the spot price. This makes sense for cus-
tomers without hourly meters and demand management systems.
However, for large, nonregulated customers, hourly meters are re-
quired and demand response is encouraged. This is done by basing
the nonregulated product on expected load rather than on actual load.
The actual‐load contract (pay as demand) is based on the customer’s
actual load in each and every hour of the commitment period. In con-
trast, the expected‐load contract is based on the customer’s expected
(forecasted) load in each and every hour of the commitment period as spec-
ified by the nonregulated customer or, if not specified, as estimated
from its historical load shape and estimated growth over the period.
The expected‐load contract hedges price risk yet still exposes the cus-
tomer to the spot price on the margin, motivating demand response,
and innovation in demand management systems.
There are a number of possible choices for the timing and frequency
of auctions and the duration of contracts. These three elements can be
adjusted to manage price and credit risk while minimizing transaction
costs. One sensible approach is quarterly auctions of 2‐year contracts,
which are rolling on an annual basis. The use of 2‐year contracts is con-
sistent with the most common contract in Colombia’s bilateral market.
The approach is simple and yet provides broad time diversification,
shielding customers from transient events. One‐eighth of regulated
load is purchased in each auction. At any one time, two products are
active, and the customer rate reflects the average of eight auctions
equally spaced over a 2‐year period. Even the auction with the shortest
planning period occurs 5 months before the start of the contract. This
means that the auction price will be set before there is much resolution
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ture strikes a balance between risk reduction and the cost of guarantees
to assure performance.
Efficient price formation is one of the most important objectives of
the forward energy market. The simultaneous descending clock auction
is used to promote efficient price formation. The descending clock auc-
tion provides excellent price discovery and enables suppliers to freely
arbitrage across the regulated and nonregulated products. This assures
that any price difference between the two products is a reflection of cost
differences.
The integration of the regulated and nonregulated markets will
lead to greater liquidity, improved price formation, and lower trans-
action costs. My view is that the forward energy market as proposed
here will dramatically improve the energy contract market for both
regulated and nonregulated customers, and improve the spot market
as well, since suppliers typically will enter the spot market with a
nearly balanced position, eliminating incentives to exercise market
power.
At first glance, it might appear that Colombia’s earlier design of in-
formal bilateral contracts would enhance innovation. It did lead to hun-
dreds of different contract types. But this heterogeneity fragmented
markets and reduced competition to the detriment of the consumer.
Rather, by standardizing products and relying on one central market,
we enhance competition and liquidity and improve price signals. This
fosters the right kind of innovation—innovation for cost reduction on
the supply side and demand response on the load side.
VI. Conclusion
I presented four examples of how market design fosters innovation. In
all cases, a basic ingredient is harnessing the power of markets and
prices to motivate decentralized decision making. Effective pricing of
scarce resources drives market participants to make good decisions in
both the short and long term. Innovation flows naturally from the in-
centives of prices, allowing flexible and creative responses to managing
resource use.
In the case of airport slots, spectrum, and electricity, a second ingre-
dient in fostering innovation is a market design that enhances competi-
tion. Competition can be especially difficult to maintain in network
industries since network constraints tend to limit substitution and in-
troduce scale economies and other nonconvexities in production. A
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as transparency of prices, improved liquidity, enhanced substitution,
and reduced transaction costs. A fragmented market can be unified
with standard products and a centralized auction. Sometimes compe-
tition is directly managed in the design with quantity caps that limit
the size of any party, set‐asides, or bidding credits that favor new en-
trants. Competition inspires innovation, and good market design en-
hances competition.
A final ingredient in fostering innovation with market design is ad-
dressing other potential market failures. The free‐rider problem must be
addressed in markets for pollution and runway use. Coordination fail-
ures of new entry are seen in electricity markets. Another potential fail-
ure is overcoming economies of scale in providing demand management
systems for electricity.
One exciting aspect of market design is working on the forefront of
theory and yet bringing that theory to practice. In the auction applica-
tions discussed here, solving real problems has proved to be an excel-
lent way to develop new theory. Nonetheless, the goal of market design
is not theory but practice: making markets work better through designs
that promote the efficient use of scarce resources, enhance competition,
and encourage innovation.
Endnote
I am grateful to the National Science Foundation for funding.
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